Dramatic hostage rescue distracts from Colombia's problems

It was like a Hollywood picture. Intelligence agents infiltrated the Colombian FARC guerrillas and led them to believe that their commander wanted to move 15 high-profile hostages held by the group, including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and three U.S. military contractors. Army commandos posing as representatives of an international nongovernmental group then landed a Russian-made helicopter and picked up the hostages. Then they were free, without a shot being fired.

We celebrate the freedom of these 15 people. They suffered greatly during up to 10 years in captivity, bound in chains in the jungle. The world could identify with their suffering, which was extensively reported.

But absent from the rescue story are many communities threatened by violence from growing right-wing paramilitaries, army killings and guerrillas, and the nearly 4 million others who are internal refugees from the war. Will the international community show interest in their suffering, and in resolving the conflict, now that Betancourt is free?

The war in Colombia does not end with the freedom of these high-profile hostages. The rescue reduces the FARC's negotiating power, but its fighting power relies on income from coca cultivation, which is rising dramatically in spite of massive U.S.-financed fumigation. The amount of Colombian land planted with coca leaf increased by 27 percent last year, according to the United Nations.

The danger is that the rescue will reinforce attempts at military solutions to the 44-year-old armed conflict. Colombia's defense minister said in announcing the rescue that if guerrillas wish to negotiate in good faith, "we offer them a dignified peace." But President Alvaro Uribe compared the fight with guerrillas to a bullfighter's, and said his "hard hand" policy will continue "until we subdue that vile pest of terrorism." That's not exactly an olive branch. For the armed conflict to end, dialogue with adversaries must begin, and become a habit.

Uribe chose a politically charged moment for the rescue. The previous week, the Colombian Supreme Court had ordered a review of the constitutional amendment that permitted him to be elected to a second term in 2006, because two decisive votes in congress were cast by legislators convicted of accepting bribes from Uribe's government in exchange for their votes. Uribe responded furiously by calling for a referendum on his rule, creating a possible third term, throwing Colombia into political turmoil. Uribe would undoubtedly win a referendum, but that is not what Colombia's constitution requires for changing the rules of governance.

This week, the committee chaired by U.S. Rep. Nita Lowey, D-Harrison, will deliberate on a new aid package for Colombia. Rep. Eliot Engel, D-Bronx, chairs the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs. Some will argue for rewarding the Colombian military for rescuing these 15 people. Yet the vast majority of what's in the aid bill has nothing to do with such operations. Instead, the bill focuses on funding coca fumigation, helicopters and supporting the army's operations of brute force, which have resulted in hundreds of killings of civilians, with almost no soldiers tried and sentenced for these crimes.

Why should the United States support a military counterdrug policy when the results are contrary to those desired? Why are U.S.-supported army units - vetted for their human-rights records and trained in human-rights standards - responsible for so many extrajudicial killings? What are the implications for Colombian democracy in President Uribe's call for a referendum to re-elect himself?

These are some questions that Lowey, Engel and other members of Congress should ask. An effective drug policy will dedicate resources to treating addiction not "bullfighting." Congress should terminate military assistance to the Colombian Army, and re-direct those funds to substance-abuse treatment programs.